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We examine the effects of changes in competitive conditions on the structure of loan
             contracts. In particular, we present conditions in which greater loan market competition
             reduces the stringency of contractual collateral requirements, a prediction that
is consistent with anecdotal evidence from loan markets. We also analyze the interaction
between the degree of competition and the efficiency of contractual renegotiation.
Insufficiently competitive markets may lead to bargaining difficulties that reduce the
efficiency of renegotiable contracts. At low levels of competition negotiable contracts
remain feasible only if collateral levels are inefficiently low.
The opinions in this article are not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank
of Philadelphia or of the Federal Reserve System.Working Paper No. 02-22
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1 Introduction
In six out of seven quarters from Q4 1996 through Q3 1998, senior loan oﬃcers at U.S. banks
reported to the Fed that new loans had been made at lower spreads, with less stringent
collateral requirements, and with less restrictive covenants than in the previous quarter.1
“More aggressive competition from other commercial bankers,” was overwhelmingly the most
common reason given for the easing of loan terms. This period was not atypical; there are
numerous periods in which bankers have spoken of strong pressures to reduce collateral
requirements and covenant restrictions in the face of strong competition.
No economist would be surprised to hear that competition leads to lower loan spreads.
However, the claim that competition had forced lenders to lower collateral requirements or
to make covenant restrictions less stringent is more mysterious. For the most part, contract
theory views collateral and restrictive covenants as contractual mechanisms for overcoming
incentive problems. According to standard models, collateral and covenants are bonding
devices that reduce borrowers’ cost of external funds in the presence of agency problems.2
Although the theoretical literature relating contract structure to competitive conditions is
sparse, the broader contracting literature oﬀers little reason to predict a decline in the severity
of agency problems when competition among lenders increases.3
1 “Senior Oﬃcer Loan Survey on Current Bank Lending Practices,” Federal Reserve Board, various issues.
2 See Longhofer and Santos (2000) for a review of the literature on collateral and Gorton and Winton (2002)
for a review of models of the structure of loan contracts.
3 Two rejoinders immediately come to mind: (i) Agency problems may become less severe during a lending
boom because default risk has declined. In this interpretation, both the increased supply of funds in the
banking sector and the decline in agency problems have a common cause, a reduction in default risk. In
this view respondents to the Fed survey are guilty of assigning a causal role to an endogenous variable. This
may be true. In a companion paper we are examining empirically the relationship between competition and
collateral requirements, controlling for default risk. That said, survey respondents are explicitly oﬀered the
opportunity to ascribe the easing of contract terms to factors related to default risk or their tolerance for risk,
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In this paper we present two main results.4 The ﬁrst examines the bankers’ claim that
competitive pressures in loan markets compel them to soften contract terms, in particular, to
lower collateral requirements or to relax covenant restrictions. We present a formal model in
which an increasingly competitive market can lead to less stringent collateral requirements.
In our model, banks produce information about borrowers to facilitate eﬃcient renegotiation
of contract terms, including selectively lowering collateral requirements for borrowers for
whom the requirement binds ineﬃciently. More competition reduces the bank’s payoﬀ in
negotiations, thereby reducing the bank’s private return from monitoring. As long as the
bank’s proﬁt-maximizing response to a decline in the net payoﬀ to monitoring is to monitor
less, an increase in competition reduces monitoring, which, in turn, reduces the accuracy
of the information available to the lender should a borrower seek to have the collateral
requirement waived. Since selective renegotiation of the collateral requirement is now a
less eﬃcient method of ﬁne-tuning the initial contract, the initial contract includes a less
stringent collateral requirement.
Our second main ﬁnding is that low levels of competition can lead to bargaining diﬃcul-
ties that aﬀect contractual form. In a sense, this is the ﬂip side of the previous result. In our
so it is likely that the loan oﬃcers themselves believe they are distinguishing competition and default risk;
(ii) A credit rationing model might explain a positive relationship between loan rates and the stringency
of loan terms. In a rationing equilibrium, loan rates might be unable to rise without exacerbating agency
problems. In response, lenders might insist on other contractual provisions–collateral and covenants–to
permit lending proﬁtably. Thus, an increase in loanable funds could lead to both a decline in loan rates and
a reduction in the stringency of other contractual restrictions. This makes sense theoretically, and, perhaps,
empirically for some historical episodes. However, given the preceding years of rapid loan growth, it is
diﬃcult to view the 1996-98 period as one in which loan markets were exiting a rationing equilibrium.
4 In its main outline, our model is related to that of an earlier paper on the choice between private and public
debt, Berlin and Mester (1992). On one level, this paper may be viewed as an extension of the earlier paper
to include: (i) endogenous monitoring; (ii) endogenous incentives to renegotiate; (iii) market competition.
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model, borrowers can’t simply wait for a contractual waiver to make signiﬁcant production
decisions. Borrowers breach collateral requirements in the expectation that the lender will
grant a contractual waiver in subsequent negotiations. But this subjects the borrower to
strategic risk. In bilateral negotiations, the incumbent lender can be expected to demand a
substantial share of the bargaining surplus. Outside competition tends to limit the incum-
bent’s bargaining power, but in a relatively noncompetitive market a borrower in breach of
contract is likely to ﬁnd itself with no competitive alternative. In turn, the borrower may
simply prefer to honor the original contract–and make ineﬃcient production decisions–
rather than seek remedies through contractual negotiations. In this case, there are two
contractual alternatives. The optimal contract may forgo renegotiation altogether. Alter-
natively, the contract may set collateral requirements ineﬃciently low so that renegotiation
remains feasible.
1.1 Related literature (incomplete)
Although our motivation and analysis applies to bank loan markets, we view our paper as
part of a broader literature on the relationship between competition and contractual form.
Perhaps surprisingly, both the empirical and theoretical literature on this issue is small.
Gompers and Lerner (1996) examine the covenants included in venture capital partnership
agreements and present evidence that the supply of funds is inversely related to the number
of covenants included. This evidence is broadly consistent with the anecdotal evidence
from loan markets cited above. From a slightly broader perspective, other authors have
found evidence for a relationship between the degree of competition and the production of
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information by bankers. Using survey data from German manufacturing, Fischer (2000)
presents evidence that banks acquire more information in concentrated markets, consistent
with the mechanism outlined in our model. Providing evidence that noncompetitive markets
facilitate long-term lending relationships, Petersen and Rajan (1995) show that the lifetime
proﬁle of loan rates is ﬂatter in concentrated markets.5
To our knowledge, the only theoretical paper that addresses the degree of competition
and the use of collateral (or covenants) in loan contracts is Manove’s, Padilla’s, and Pagano’s
(2001) model of lazy banks. In their paper, high quality borrowers post collateral in com-
petitive markets to distinguish themselves from low quality borrowers, and the endogenous
revelation of borrower type may induce banks to forego monitoring. Interestingly, their main
empirical prediction is diametrically opposed to ours; they predict that borrowers are more
likely to post collateral in competitive loan markets than in loan markets where banks have
monopoly power. In a model of venture capital contracts, Inderst and M¨ uller (2002) exam-
ine the eﬀects of supply and demand factors on optimal contract design. Among their many
interesting results–which mainly focus on the relative merits of equity-like and debt-like
contracts as lenders’ and borrowers’ bargaining power change–they ﬁnd that monitoring is
lower in a market where the supply of funds is plentiful. While this conclusion is similar to
ours, the underlying reason is quite diﬀerent. In their model a limited supply of “informed
capital”places bounds on the use of contracts that rely on monitoring.
5 We do not review the banking literature relating market structure and portfolio risk. In our model, more
competition leads to less monitoring, and empirically, this would be associated with more loan losses. We
do not emphasize this aspect of the model, and most studies concerned with competition and risk- taking
focus on issues unrelated to our main concerns. See Gorton and Winton (2002) for a review of the literature
on market structure and risk taking.
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Our model is also related to a growing strand of the literature that relates lenders’
incentive to screen borrowers in diﬀerent market structures.6 In these contributions the
bank’s incentive to produce information declines with more competition, a feature our model
shares. Our paper diﬀers from other contributions in this literature in a number of ways.
Most notably, we are concerned with contract design, unlike other papers in this literature.
Second, since this literature focuses on ex ante screening and credit granting decisions, the
other papers don’t analyze bargaining and renegotiation, a central element in our model,
and, we believe, a central feature of bank lending.
Our result concerning the extent of competition and the possibility of bargaining diﬃ-
culties is related to Rajan’s (1992) result that a lender’s ex post bargaining power reduces
the borrower’s incentive to take eﬀort ex ante.
The paper proceeds as follows. We present the model in Section 2, and in Section 3
we examine competition, the interim bargaining game, and the ﬁrm’s production decisions.
In Section 4 we present our main results. Here we derive the optimal contract both when
competition is strong and weak and discuss why the optimal contract is aﬀected by the
degree of competition. Section 5 concludes and presents directions for further research.
2 The model
2.1 The agents
The timing of the model is shown in Figure 1.
6 See, among others, Caminal and Matutes (2002), Cao and Shi (2000), Hauswald and Marquez (forthcom-
ing), and Tr¨ oge (2000).
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There are two risk-neutral banks, indexed by k ∈ {1,2} and a single risk-neutral borrow-
ing ﬁrm with a project but no wealth. All agents live for three periods, t = 0,1,2.
In period 0, $1 ﬂows to only one of the two banks; each bank receives the $1 with equal
probability. The bank that receives the funds will be the ﬁrm’s initial lender. In period 1,
the supply of funds is a random variable F ∈ {1,2}, that is, the supply of funds in period 1
is either $1 or $2, with prob(F =2 )=λ and prob(F = 1)=1 − λ. For present purposes,
we assume that if F = 1 in period 1, the bank that received funds in period 0 also receives
the funds in period 1.I fF =2 , only one of the banks will invest in the existing loan, while
the other will invest in storage.
2.2 The production process
The ﬁrm has a project that requires $1 of funds at the beginning of period 0 and which
yields ﬁnal payoﬀs in period 2. At the beginning of period 0, the ﬁrm approaches the bank
for a loan. At this time, the ﬁrm and its lender know only that the ﬁrm will be one of two
types, j ∈ {g,b},w h e r e ,prob(j = g)=p and prob(j = b)=1 − p.W er e f e rt ot h et y p eg
ﬁrm as a good ﬁrm and a type b ﬁrm as a bad ﬁrm.
The ﬁrm makes a production decision in period 1 after learning its type but before
the supply of funds is known. This decision requires the ﬁrm to allocate its resources
between two mutually exclusive types of activities: posting collateral and investing in growth
opportunities. We emphasize two (nonexclusive) interpretations of posting collateral. The
ﬁrst is literal: funds invested in liquid assets–inventories or accounts receivable–that can
be readily seized by a lender. Less literally, the ﬁrm can choose production activities that
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generate immediate cash ﬂows and guarantee repayment in period 2. Such activities are
reﬂected in accounting measures of ﬁrm liquidity and proﬁtability that are the basis for
covenants in many loan contracts. This second interpretation reﬂects bankers’ common
parlance, in which the general assets of the ﬁrm are viewed as a source of collateral, even
when a loan is not secured by particular assets. A ﬁrm of type j that posts x dollars of its





xx(x) < 0,j= g,b. (1)
Revenues are readily transferred to the lender, that is, they can’t be hidden or consumed by
the borrower.






xx(x) < 0,j= g,b. (2)
For concreteness, think of these growth opportunities as intangible investments in R&D
or marketing, which yield future payoﬀs, but which have little value as collateral. A key
feature of these growth opportunities is that they are nontransferable within the model’s time
frame.7 The future cash ﬂows from assets may be nontransferable for a number of reasons.
T h er e a l i z a t i o no ft h e s eo p p o r t u n i t i e sm a yd e p e n di na ne s s e n t i a lw a yo nt h eh u m a nc a p i t a l
7 Note we are not claiming that it is impossible to sell ﬁnancial claims on the cash ﬂows to intangible assets.
For our purposes, any cash ﬂows that can be pledged should be included in revenues, and any cash ﬂows
that cannot be pledged should be included in growth opportunities.
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or eﬀort of the ﬁrm’s employees, in which case the ﬁrm may be unable to credibly pledge
payments to outsiders without destroying the value of the assets. Alternatively, the lender
may be unable to hold very long-term contractual claims, perhaps because of regulatory
restrictions on holding equity.
It is eﬃcient for the good ﬁrm to dedicate all investment to growth opportunities and for









x(x) > 0. (3)
In addition to investing in projects there is a storage technology yielding a zero return.
Ab a n kc o u l dn e v e rl e n dp r o ﬁtably to a known, bad ﬁrm, and lending to a known, good ﬁrm
w o u l db ea l w a y sb ep r o ﬁtable, even if that ﬁrm invested completely in growth opportunities,
that is,
R
g(0) > 1,a n dR
b(1) < 1. (4)
At the outset of period 1,at y p ejﬁrm can be liquidated to yield Lj,w h i c hw ea s s u m et o
be independent of xj for simplicity alone. A bank would never choose to liquidate a ﬁrm
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2.3 Information structure
2.3.1 The banks’ information
At t=0, before the supply of funds has been directed to one of the two banks, each bank
invests an amount, q ∈ [0,1], which permits it to observe a noisy indicator of the borrower’s
type in period 1, s ∈ {g,b},a tc o s tc(q)=
cq2
2 .8 The bank’s expenditure on monitoring is
noncontractible. We think of the expenditure as the cost of creating a general purpose mon-
itoring apparatus that permits the bank to interpret information about borrowers. While
this is a general purpose technology, observing the indicator for a particular ﬁrm requires
direct contact with the ﬁrm.
There are two ways in which the ﬁrm and the bank may establish contact. First, if the
bank makes the initial loan to the ﬁrm in period 0, it observes the indicator in period 1
as a matter of course. Alternatively, the ﬁrm may approach a new bank in period 1.I n
this case, the bank can examine the ﬁrm’s books, have discussions with management, etc.,
permitting the bank to form a knowledgeable view of the ﬁrm’s prospects. While there
are many ways that we could model the information received by a new lender, we adopt a
particularly simple formulation that captures the asymmetry between an incumbent lender
and a new entrant without too much complicated machinery.
We assume that a new lender observes the same realization of the indicator as the initial
lender–that is, the indicators observed by the incumbent and the entrant are perfectly
correlated–but at an added cost to the borrowing ﬁrm, m. Thus, the incumbent and the
entrant are symmetrically informed once the ﬁrm has been monitored by the entrant. The
8 All of our results hold for general convex cost functions unless explicitly noted.
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added cost reﬂects the extra time and resources required for the ﬁrm to ﬁnd the new lender,
prepare its books, and make its case that it is a proﬁtable investment.9
2.3.2 The borrower’s information
The borrower is assumed to observe its realization of s ( a sw e l la si t st y p e )b e f o r em a k i n g
his production choice. This assumption–and our assumption that the banks’ indicators are
perfectly correlated–are sensible if the underlying source of noise is the discrepancy between
the ﬁrm’s true condition and the inference about the ﬁrm’s condition that would be drawn
by a well-informed observer with ready access to the ﬁrm.
Imagine, for example, that the ﬁrm is introducing a new brand of detergent and that
consumers’ initial response has been favorable. It is reasonable to think that the ﬁrm has
better information than any lender, because it has access to information that no lender will
have, for example, that the detergent disintegrates clothes in a small minority of cases. It
is also reasonable to think that the ﬁrm itself is the ﬁrst to evaluate consumers’ response–
as measured by sales and questionnaires in particular test markets–and that the ﬁrm can
predict lenders’ likely interpretation of the results. Our assumptions are less convincing if we
view the source of noise to be distinct agents having distinct information sets or idiosyncratic
ways of making judgements.10
9 The modelling device that the borrower, rather than the entrant, bears the cost is partly a matter of
convenience. We avoid the untenable conclusion that entry is impossible, without resorting to unnecessarily
complicated mixed strategies. At the same time, the assumption reﬂects the sensible economic claim that
the lender’s marginal costs of evaluating an additional borrower are low compared to the ﬁxed costs (q)o f
initially setting up a monitoring apparatus.
10The issues that arise when lenders have imperfectly correlated information–especially the possibility that
more competition may increase adverse selection–have been explored by Broecker (1990).
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2.3.3 Parametric restrictions
We adopt the following simple parameterization. Let








Thus, the precision of the banks’ information increases with its initial monitoring expendi-
ture.
The nature of the equilibrium depends on the informativeness of the indicator. Let







































We make the following parametric restrictions. Throughout, we assume that the equilibrium
level of monitoring is high enough that a lender’s liquidation decision would be swayed by









that is, a ﬁrm with a good indicator has higher expected revenues than either storage for
another period or immediate liquidation. Similarly, we assume,
φgbR
g(x)+φbbR
b(x) < min[1, φgbL
g + φbbL
b], ∀x, (8)
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which says that a ﬁrm with a bad indicator has lower expected revenues than either storage
or immediate liquidation. In Section 4 we discuss the implications of these inequalities not
holding.
2.4 Contracts
A period 0 contract, hro,x oi, has two terms, the loan rate factor, ro,a n dt h er e q u i r e d
collateral, xo. The contract gives the lender the right to liquidate the ﬁrm in period 1 if the
ﬁrm’s collateral falls below its required level. We rule out short-term contracts, in which the
lender can freely refuse to roll-over its ﬁrst period loan.11
2.5 Competition
We adopt a simple model to capture the eﬀect of competitive conditions on contractual form.
Recently, a number of authors have explored models of Bertrand competition between in-
formed and uninformed lenders.12 Our model shares the main prediction of these models,
that competition from an uninformed lender has a tendency to reduce the incumbent’s in-
centive to monitor. The main lessons of our model are likely to be robust to changes in the
precise model of interim competition chosen–as long as more competition yields lower rents
11Short-term contracts will never be eﬃcient if growth opportunities are suﬃciently valuable or if the infor-
mation upon which liquidation decisions are made is suﬃciently noisy.
12By assuming that an entrant can become informed at a cost, we adopt a diﬀerent approach than some of the
recent literature in which the incumbant remains better informed than the entrant. The original contributions
in this literature include Englebricht-Wiggins, Milgrom and Weber(1982), Sharpe (1990), and Rajan (1992).
More recent contributions include Von Thadden (2002), and those mentioned in footnote 6, among others.
For our purposes, the alternative modeling choice of assuming competition between asymmetrically informed
lenders in period 1 introduces an uninteresting complications:. contractual terms chosen in period 0 will aﬀect
the mixed-strategies of the borrowers and lenders in the period 1 competition. Note, our results require only
that competition reduce an incumbent’s ex post proﬁts. They would continue to hold true if the incumbent
received positive (but reduced) rents in the fact of competition, as predicted by other models of interim
competition.
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for the incumbent lender.
At the beginning of period 1 the supply of funds F is realized and observed by all market
participants. If F = 2 there are 2 potential lenders, while if F = 1 there is only 1 potential
lender, the ﬁrm’s original bank. Whether or not the market is competitive, the ﬁrm’s original
bank makes a take-it-or-leave it oﬀer (possibly random) to the ﬁrm.13
We model competition as a one-shot, simultaneous move game between the incumbent
bank and the ﬁrm, with the potential entrant playing a largely passive role. After F has
been realized, the incumbent bank quotes a loan rate (r0)w h i l et h eﬁrm chooses whether to
solicit a competing oﬀer (re) from the entrant at added cost m.
3 Bargaining with and without competition.
Before stating the maximization problem explicitly it is convenient to solve for the equilib-
rium outcome in the interim competition game and to determine the ﬁrm’s optimal choice
of xjs,j= g,b, s = g,b.
3.1 Competition
In this section we show that when funds are plentiful, that is, when F=2, competition between
the entrant and incumbent yields an outcome in which: (1)O n l y ﬁrms with good indicators
seek out competitive oﬀers; (2) Competition ensures that lenders’ proﬁts are driven to zero.
We state this formally in the following lemma:
13We adopt this formulation, which gives the bank all the bargaining power when the market is non-
competititive, both for simplicity and because it retains symmetry between the bargaining games with and
without competition. If the borrower had bargaining power in bilateral negotiations game our qualitative
results would not change. However, the lender must have some bargaining power in the bilateral bargaining
game, or else it will not monitor.
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Lemma 1 In the interim competition game, only a good ﬁrm with s = g ever solicits an
oﬀer from the potential entrant. The ﬁrm’s expected proﬁts (πf) and the incumbent bank’s
expected proﬁts (πi) are,
π
f = R
g(xgg) − 1 − m + K
g(xgg),a n d (9)
π
i =0 . (10)
The bad ﬁrm with s = g always remains with the incumbent lender. This equilibrium exists
if and only if:
R
g(xgg) − 1 − m + K
g(xgg) ≥ R
g(xo) − ro + K
g(xo)( 11)
Proof: It is immediate from inequality (8) that any ﬁrm with s = b would never beneﬁt
from approaching a new bank, because the indicator is suﬃciently informative that the bank
would never make a loan to such a borrower. Now consider a bad ﬁrm with s = g.B y
inequality (4), the bad ﬁrm always defaults in period 2, whatever its loan rate, so (denoting
min[a,b]b y [ a,b]− and max[a,b]b y[ a,b]+),
[Rb(x) − r0,0]+ + Kb(x)=[ Rb(x) − re,0]+ + Kb(x)=Kb(x),
for any x. It is clearly unproﬁtable for such a ﬁrm to pay a cost (m)t os e e kal o w e rl o a nr a t e
that doesn’t increase its expected proﬁts, except possibly in a pure-strategy equilibrium, in
which bad ﬁrms with a positive indicator feel compelled to mimic good ﬁrms with a positive
indicator.14 However, no pure-strategy equilibrium is possible as long as ﬁrms actually solicit
oﬀers, as we show below. Thus a bad ﬁrm with s = g always remains with the incumbent
lender.
To see where the proﬁt expressions come from, consider an equilibrium in which the ﬁrm
plays a mixed strategy {solicit competitive oﬀer (re), don’t solicit a competitive oﬀer} with
probabilities {δ,1−δ}. The incumbent’s best response must be drawn from the pair of loan
14We assume that it is impossible for a lender to observe the probability distribution governing the borrower’s
mix of strategies.
15Working Paper No. 02-22
Collateral and Competition
rates {Rg(xgg),re}, with probabilities {η,1 − η). In the event the ﬁrm doesn’t solicit an
oﬀer, the incumbent would only be losing proﬁts if it demanded less than the full revenue,
Rg(xgg). In the event the ﬁrm does solicit an oﬀer, the incumbent bank can charge no more
than the rate oﬀered by the competitor without losing the customer. Since the added cost
of approaching a new lender is born by the ﬁrm, the rate will be the competitive rate, that
is, re = 1.
T h eg a m ec a nb er e p r e s e n t e da sf o l l o w s .
Incumbent Bank
Monopoly rate Competitive rate
Solicit oﬀer 0 1
Firm Rg(xgg) − 1 − m + Kg(xgg) Rg(xgg) − 1 − m + Kg(xgg)
Don’t solicit oﬀer Rg(xgg) 1
Kg(xgg) Rg(xgg) − 1 + Kg(xgg)
Examination of the game shows that there is no pure strategy equilibrium. If the ﬁrm
solicits an oﬀer from the incumbent, the bank’s best response is to oﬀer the competitive
rate, but if the bank oﬀers the competitive rate the ﬁrm’s best response is to save the cost of
soliciting an oﬀer.15 In a mixed-strategy equilibrium, the ﬁrm must be indiﬀerent between
soliciting a competing oﬀer and not soliciting an oﬀer, that is,
[R
g(xgg) − 1 − m + K
g(xgg)] = ηK
g(xgg)+( 1 − η)[R
g(xgg) − 1 + K
g(xgg)],
15Note that this logic also rules out a pooling equilibrium in which bad ﬁrms also solicit oﬀers with positive
probability. That is, any pooling equilibrium in which the bad ﬁrm mimicked good ﬁrms would also involve
mixed strategies. But since the strategy can’t be observed, the bad ﬁrm would have no incentive to solicit
competitive bids by our preceeding argument.
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Solving these two equations yields proﬁt expressions (9) and (10) in Lemma 1.
Intuitively, each of the players has a pure strategy with a payoﬀ that is independent of
the other’s strategy. If the borrowing ﬁrm chooses ‘solicit’ its payoﬀ is always Rg(xgg) −
1 −m+Kg(xgg), and if the incumbent lender chooses ‘competitive rate’ its payoﬀ is always
1. Since the agents are indiﬀerent between the strategies in a mixed-strategy equilibrium,
these must be the agents’ expected proﬁts.
It is immediate that the ﬁrm will seek a competitive oﬀer with positive probability only
if m satisﬁes
R
g(xgg) − 1 − m + K
g(xgg) ≥ R
g(xo) − ro + K
g(xo).
(Note that we are assuming that Rg(xo) >r o, as we shall throughout the rest of the paper.)
Otherwise, the good ﬁrm would prefer to simply honor the original contract and stay with
the incumbent. QED
3.2 The ﬁrm’s production decision
In this section we show how the bargaining environment aﬀects equilibrium production
choices. Firms with bad indicators will always honor the original contracts, whatever the
bargaining environment. However, ﬁrms with good indicators must make a choice. In
particular, a good ﬁrm with a positive indicator must decide whether to make an eﬃcient
production decision and breach the contract or simply to honor the original contract. The
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decision will depend on the likelihood of a favorable bargaining environment, which, in turn,
depends on the likelihood that competition will strengthen the ﬁrm’s bargaining position.16
First consider a ﬁrm with a bad indicator, i.e., s = b. Given inequality (8), the incumbent
bank would prefer to liquidate the ﬁrm (if possible) and a new entrant would prefer to invest
any new funds in storage than to make a loan, whatever the ﬁrms choice of xjb,j= g,b.17
Thus, any ﬁrm with s = b will always choose to honor the initial contract, that is,
xjb = xo,j= g,b. (12)
Thus, the collateral requirement reduces agency costs. Without the collateral constraint,
the bad ﬁrm would always ineﬃciently choose xbs = 0–which is ineﬃcient by assumption
(3)–because the ﬁrm knows that it will retain its growth opportunities Kb(xbs), even though
it will always default in period 2. It is in the bad ﬁrm’s best interest to maximize the value of
its growth opportunities even though this ineﬃciently reduces its period 2 revenues. Thus,
a collateral constraint, enforced by a credible threat to liquidate the ﬁrm in the event of
breach, forces the bad ﬁrm to produce more revenues that it otherwise would.
Now consider a ﬁrm with s = g. From inequality (7), the incumbent bank would always
prefer to make an oﬀer to the ﬁrm, as would an entrant bank, whatever the ﬁrm’s choice of
xgg.T h e ﬁrm will choose between two values:
16Bad ﬁrms with positive indicators simply make the same production decision as the good ﬁrm with a
positive indicator.
17If inequality (8) is not satisﬁed for any x, the contract is unenforceable because the collateral requirement
will be ignored by the borrower. If it is satisﬁed for some x0 <x o, then the contract will set the collateral
requirement at x0.






0 if λ[Rg(0) − 1 − m + Kg(0)] + (1 − λ)Kg(0) ≥ Rg(xo) − ro + Kg(xo)
xo,o t h e r w i s e .
(13)
To see why this must be true, note ﬁr s tt h a tt h exgg = 0 maximizes joint surplus, given
assumption (3).18 However, the good ﬁrm places itself in a strategically vulnerable position
whenever it breaches the contract by choosing xgg <x o. With probability λ the market is
competitive and the ﬁrm captures the full contractual surplus (minus the added costs, m,
of reducing the informational asymmetry between the incumbent bank and the potential
entrant). However, with probability 1−λ,t h eﬁrm will be engaged in a bilateral bargaining
game with the incumbent bank and–given our polar assumption that the lender has all the
bargaining power–the ﬁrm retains only the (nontransferable) growth opportunities in the
event of breach. The equilibrium outcome then depends on the probability of a plentiful
supply of funds (λ) generating ex post competition, among other factors. Under competitive
market conditions (high λ), the inequality is likely to hold and the ﬁrm will breach the
contract in the expectation that it will capture a suﬃciently large share of the contractual
surplus. In a noncompetitive market (low λ), the ﬁrm expects to keep little beyond its
growth opportunities. In the following section we discuss inequality (13) in more detail.
Since it plays no further role in our analysis, it is convenient to assume that m ≈ 0a n d
to drop the term from here on in.
18If inequality (7) holds only for some x>0, then the ﬁrm with a good indicator will choose this level, as
long as it is less than the contractual collateral requirment. This wouldn’t change anything in the analysis.
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4O p t i m a l C o n t r a c t s
In this section we present our main results. After stating the general contracting problem,
we consider two separate regimes. First we assume that the inequality in (13) doesn’t bind, so
the expected beneﬁts of renegotiation to the borrower outweigh the costs of placing himself in
a strategically vulnerable position when in breach of the contract. As we show, the inequality
in (13) doesn’t bind when the market is suﬃciently competitive, so we refer to this region as
one of strong competition. When competition is strong, an increase in competition reduces
the stringency of the collateral requirement (under reasonable conditions). We then examine
the relationship between the degree of competition and agents’ incentive to bargain. First we
show that the the inequality in (13) becomes less binding as λ increases. When competition is
weak contracts must contain ineﬃciently low collateral requirements to induce the borrower
to bear the strategic risk of remedying contractual ineﬃciencies through renegotiations. In
this case, nonnegotiable contracts may dominate negotiable contracts. We also show that
when competition is weak an increase in the degree of competition leads to a decline in the
stringency of the negotiable contract (again, under reasonable conditions).
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g(0) − 1 + K
g(0)] + (1 − λ)K
g(0) ≥ R
g(xo) − ro + K
g(xo). (17)
Expression (14) denotes the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁts, expression (15) denotes the bank’s
participation constraint, expression (16) is the incentive compatibility condition for the
bank’s level of monitoring, and inequality (17) ensures that the borrower with s = g chooses
xjg = 0 and seeks to renegotiate the contract. Remember that each bank chooses its mon-
itoring level in period 0 before the ﬁrm approaches one of the banks for a loan. Since the
banks are completely symmetric at this point, it is convenient to drop the scaling term 1/2.
Expressions (14) and (15) incorporate the results of the last two sections that a ﬁrm with
s = g chooses xjg = 0 and either renegotiates the contract with the initial lender or signs a
contract with a new lender, while a ﬁrm with s = b honors the initial contract. They also
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incorporate Lemma 1; in particular, the ﬁrst term of expression (15) incorporates the result
that the initial lender receives zero proﬁts when it faces competition.
4.1 Optimal contracts when competition is strong
In this subsection we assume that inequality (17) doesn’t bind. We present (reasonable)
conditions under which the optimal loan contract requires less collateral when the market
becomes more competitive.
Proposition 2 Assume that inequality (17) doesn’t bind: (i) Then an increase in the degree
of competition reduces the stringency of the collateral constraint if and only if an increase
































































Proof: In Appendix A.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is as follows. The optimal collateral requirement
maximizes the bank’s and the ﬁrm’s expected joint proﬁts–given the bank’s level of moni-



















x(xo)] = 0. (20)
This ﬁrst-order-condition clearly displays the main trade-oﬀ that determines the op-
timal level of collateral. Given assumption (3), the ﬁrst term (the marginal cost of the
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collateral requirement) is negative and the second term (the marginal beneﬁt of the collat-
eral requirement) is positive. The collateral requirement balances the marginal cost–lost
growth opportunities for a good buyer that has been misclassiﬁed–against the marginal
beneﬁt–greater control over a bad borrower that has been correctly identiﬁed. Note that
the expected marginal cost of the collateral requirement is decreasing in the accuracy of the
indicator, while the expected marginal beneﬁt is increasing in the accuracy of the indicator
In a more competitive market the bank’s expected rents from negotiations are lower;
thus, the bank’s marginal return to monitoring is lower at any given level of required collat-
eral. This follows, since the bank receives these rents only when the good ﬁrm is correctly
identiﬁed, and then, only to the extent that these rents are not captured by the ﬁrm through




(1−λ). If the substitution eﬀect of a change
in the net payoﬀ to monitoring dominates the income eﬀect–the intuition underlying the
requirement that
dqo
dc < 0i n( 18)–the bank monitors less when its bargaining rents are lower.
(In the proof of Proposition 2 in the appendix, we show that
dqo
dλ < 0 ⇐⇒
dqo
dc < 0.)S i n c e
the indicator is less accurate at lower levels of monitoring, the marginal cost of the collateral
requirement rises and the marginal beneﬁt of the collateral requirements falls as monitor-
ing declines. Accordingly, the optimal collateral requirement is lower when competition is
stronger.
Condition (19) makes more precise the conditions in which substitution eﬀect in the net
payoﬀ to monitoring dominates the income eﬀect. Consider the two bracketed terms on
the left-hand side of condition (19). If the monitoring cost function is relatively steep, a
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small reduction in monitoring leads to a large decline in the cost of monitoring. When the
curvature of the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ function in the collateral level is high, only a small decline in the
collateral requirement is needed reduce the ineﬃciencies arising from a less precise indicator.
Thus, the optimal contract adjusts to a decline in the net return to monitoring by inducing
a lower level of monitoring and reducing the stringency of the collateral constraint.19
4.2 Optimal contracts when competition is weak
First, we present conditions in which constraint (17) is violated for the contract that max-
imizes (14) subject to (15), and (16). Our main result is that the constraint becomes less
binding as market becomes more competitive, so this contract may be infeasible when the
loan market is suﬃciently noncompetitive. We also show that when competition is weak,
the covenant level must be set ineﬃciently low to satisfy constraint (17 ) ,s oa st oi n d u c et h e
borrower to seek to renegotiate the contract.
Our main result concerning the relationship between the degree of competition and the
feasibility of negotiations is the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Let hro(λ),x o(λ)i maximize (14) subject to (15), and (16). If dxo
dλ < 0,
there exists ˜ λ such that,
{λ[R
g(0) − 1 + K









Proof: In Appendix A.
19While condition (19) is reasonable, it is not satisﬁed automatically. If the inequality is reversed, an increase
in competition leads to less monitoring and lower collateral requirements. The condition would not hold, for
example, if the monitoring function were linear.
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The expression in left brackets is simply constraint (17) reversed. Part of the intuition
behind Proposition 3 is obvious from an inspection of the left-hand side of the inequality.
When the borrower expects that bargaining rents will ﬂow mainly to the bank (λ low), the
decision to breach the contract and to seek a remedy through renegotiation, will appear
less attractive; that is, the left-hand side of the inequality in the left brackets is declining
in λ. But the matter is slightly more subtle than this. We know from Proposition 2 that
the collateral requirement is more stringent at low levels of competition, and examination of
the right-hand-side of the inequality shows that–holding the loan rate constant–the initial
contract is also unattractive to a borrower constrained by a stringent collateral requirement.
So, both sides of the inequality are low when competition is weak (λ low).
Of course, the loan rate doesn’t remain constant as the level of competition changes. At
low levels of competition, the initial lender expects to capture substantial rents in negotia-
tions, both because of its bargaining power in bilateral negotiations and because the indicator
will accurately identify the good borrower much of the time. (Remember, monitoring–and,
thus, the accuracy of the indicator–increases as competition decreases.) The greater accu-
racy of the indicator means that the bank captures a larger share of its payoﬀs from borrowers





(1 − λ); and from (ii) bad borrowers forced to produce revenues




. It also captures a smaller
share of its revenues through the loan rate, which is paid only by good borrowers who are




. Thus, when competition is weak, a
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relatively low loan rate satisﬁes the bank’s participation constraint, and the right-hand-side
of the inequality is relatively high even though the collateral requirement is stringent. In a
fundamental sense, the level of monitoring is too high to sustain renegotiation.20
We say that competition is weak if λ < ˜ λ, . When competition is weak the optimal
renegotiable contract no longer maximizes the borrower’s and lender’s joint proﬁts (given
the incentive compatible level of monitoring). With a slight abuse of notation, let hxλ,r λi
denote the optimal renegotiable contract when competition is weak. This contract satisﬁes:
λ[R
g(0) − 1 + K
g(0)] + (1 − λ)K
g(0) = R
g(xλ) − rλ + K
g(xλ), (22)
the bank’s zero proﬁt constraint, (15), and the incentive compatibility condition for moni-
toring, (16). The main features of this contract are contained in the following proposition,
Proposition 4 (i) When competition is weak the collateral requirement is lower than the
level that maximizes the borrower’s and lender’s joint proﬁts (given the bank’s chosen level of
monitoring), that is, xλ <x o(λ). (ii) In this region an increase in the degree of competition
reduces the stringency of the collateral constraint if and only if an increase in the steepness













Proof. In Appendix A.
The intuititon behind this result follows immediately from the discussion following Propo-
sition 3. When competition is weak the borrower’s strategic vulnerability inhibits renego-
tiation. The initial contract must be designed to induce the good borrower to make an
eﬃcient production choice and seek to remedy the contract breach through negotiations.
20However, note that qo is below the level that would be chosen if the contract and monitoring level were
chosen to maximize expected joint proﬁts in period 0.
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This requires an ineﬃciently low collateral requirement to reduce the lender’s incentive to
monitor, since we know that xo(λ)a n dqo(λ)w e r etoo high to satisfy constraint (17). Of
course, there is a loss of eﬃciency when the constraint binds. On the one hand, monitoring



















x(xλ)] > 0, (24)
because xλ <x o. Compare this with the ﬁrst order condition (20) when competition is strong.
When competition is weak, the collateral requirement imposes too little control over the bad
borrower.
A potentially interesting implication of the preceding analysis is that competitive con-
ditions aﬀect the value of the option to renegotiate contracts. In the case of a quadratic
cost function, when (21) holds a renegotiable contract always dominates a contract without
renegotiation.21 This is no longer true when (21) is violated, because the constraint imposes
a second restriction in addition to the incentive compatibility condition for the bank’s level
of monitoring, the ineﬃciently low collateral requirement. In Appendix B, we describe the
optimal nonnegotiable contract.
Empirically, the model suggests that when the supply of funds to the banking sector is
very tight, we are likely to observe two types of contractual adaptations. Some borrowers
retain a close lending relationship with their bank–in the sense that the borrower can
expect the lender to take seriously requests to renegotiate contractual clauses. However,
21For any continuous cost function where c(0) = 0, the ﬁrst-order condition for xo in the renegotiable contract
approaches that of a nonnegotiable contract. (See condition (20)). For a cost function with c(0) > 0, a
nonnegotiable contract might dominate for suﬀciently high ﬁxed cost. However, the main point–that a lax
collateral constraint designed to satisfy (17) makes the option to negotiate less valuable–is general.
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collateral requirements and covenants are high for these borrowers and the bank’s required
compensation for adjusting contracts through renegotiation is also high. Other borrowers
may shift to nonbank sources–for example, ﬁnance companies–for which renegotiation is
diﬃcult or impossible.
5 Conclusion and directions for future research
In this paper we present two main results. The ﬁrst examines a claim often made by
bankers that competitive pressures in loan markets compel them to soften contract terms, in
particular, to lower collateral requirements and to relax covenant restrictions. We present a
formal model in which an increase in competition can lead to less stringent collateral require-
ments. In our model, initial contracts are designed to be very stringent, in the expectation
that they can be renegotiated in light of evolving information. But renegotiation requires
the lender to produce information about the borrower, and the lender’s monitoring eﬀort
is chosen to maximize its own proﬁts. More competition reduces the lender’s bargaining
rents, thereby reducing the bank’s private return to monitoring. When lenders monitor less
their information is less accurate, and ﬁne-tuning the initial contract through renegotiation
becomes more diﬃcult. In turn, the initial contracts are optimally less stringent.
Our second ﬁnding is that that low levels of competition can lead to bargaining diﬃ-
culties. Borrowers put themselves at strategic risk when they breach a contract in the
expectation that the breach will be remedied through renegotiation. When competition is
weak, borrowers may prefer to honor the original contract, rather than risk being put at a
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bargaining disadvantage in bilateral negotiations. When the likelihood of receiving an oﬀer
from a competing lender is too low, renegotiable contracts impose ineﬃciently lax collat-
eral requirements, that is, the level of collateral is lower than the level that maximizes the
borrowers’s and lender’s joint proﬁts (conditional on the level of monitoring). This ineﬃ-
ciency makes renegotiable contracts relatively less proﬁtable, and some borrowers may shift
to funding sources where renegotiation is impossible.
While the model might be enriched in many ways, our main goal is to empirically test
the relationship between competitive conditions and contractual form. Although this paper
has taken the anecdotal and survey evidence at face value, market participants may well
be drawing false inferences when they report that loan terms are less stringent because of
competitive forces. The main challenge in this investigation is to distinguish the eﬀects of
competitive conditions and the default risk; speciﬁcally, periods in which the supply of funds
increases are also periods in which default risk decreases. In a companion paper, we are
using the Federal Reserve System’s Survey of Terms of Bank Lending to examine the extent
the relationship between the use of collateral and the degree of competition.
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6 Figure: The timing of the model
Period 0
Both banks invest q in monitoring.
$1 of funds arrives at one of the banks.
Loan Contract is signed
Between Period 0 and Period 1
Firm learns type j ∈ {g,b}.
Firms and banks observe indicator s ∈ {g,b}.
Firm makes production choice xjs
The supply of funds (F ∈ {1,2}) is realized.
Period 1
Firm chooses whether to approach new lender.
Firm may negotiate new contract.
Incumbent may liquidate ﬁrm in breach of contract.
Period 2
Firm produces revenues and makes loan payments.
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7 Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 2:
Maximizing the bank’s expected proﬁts with respect to qo–assuming that Rg(x) >r o



















b(xo) − cqo =0 . (25)



















+ cqo(1 − qo)
¸
=0 . (26)
An optimal contract that maximizes the borrower’s expected proﬁts subject to a zero
proﬁt constraint for the lender–given the bank’s prior choice of q– must maximize joint






































Maximizing this expression with respect to xo we get,
22The ﬁrst-order approach is appropriate because the probability distribution prob(s = j0 | j = j0)o b e y s
ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance. That is, p(s = g | t = g)a n dp(s = b | t = b) are both increasing in q.






















x(xo)] = 0. (28)
Note that the ﬁrst-order condition for xo contains no term that includes λ or c;a sl o n g
as conditions (7), (8), and the inequality in (13) hold, only ﬁrms with s = b actually hold
collateral.
Equations (26) and(27) can be solved for xo and qo. To establish Proposition 1,t o t a l l y






















































x > 0,b y(1),
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g(0) − 1] < 0,b y(4).
Π
B
qc = −[cqo − qo(1 − qo) < 0. (29)
















































A>0 requires that the curvature of the payoﬀ functions, Rj
xx +Kj
xx,j= g,b, and of the




P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :
Rearrange the ﬁrst-order condition for qo, equation (25), to get,
(1 − λ)R
g(0) − ro =
2
p














g(x)] − λ =( 1 − λ)R
g(0) − ro (35)

















− cqo ≥ 0. (36)
We must show that the left-hand-side of this inequality is increasing in λ.D i ﬀerentiating
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and substituting for dxo
dλ and
dqo
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This must be true, since the left-hand-side is positive and the right-hand-side is negative,
given (1) and (3). Thus, we have shown that {A>0} =⇒ {expression (37) > 0}
QED
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
















− cqλ =0 . (47)
Diﬀerentiating this constraint and ΠB(xλ,r λ)–deﬁned in (26)–with respect to x,q,c, and




























































The numerators of expressions (48) and (49) are positive and the numerators are the same.
Thus,











































This proves (ii). To see that (i) is true, use (36). Since inquality (17) is not satisﬁed at





































8.0.1 The optimal contract without renegotiation
Here we now show that contract without renegotiation can’t involve monitoring. Assume
that the optimal contract does not involve renegotiation because the level of competition is
too low. Let hrn,x ni denote the optimal contract without renegotiation. Then if
pR
g(xn)+( 1 − p)R
b(xn) <p L
g +( 1 − p)L
b, (52)
the contract is enforceable without monitoring. Inequality (52) says that the expected
revenues produced by a borrower who always honors the collateral requirement are lower
than the expected liquidation value of the ﬁrm in period 1. In this case, the incumbent
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lender would prefer to liquidate any borrower j who chose xj <x n. Knowing this, the
borrower would choose xj = xn.















− − 1} +( 1 − p){[R
b(xn),r n]
− − 1} ≥ 0, (54)
where expression (53) denotes the borrower’s expected proﬁts and expression (54) denotes
the bank’s participation constraint. Note, in this case the contract is unaﬀected by the
degree of competition. To see this, imagine a competitor oﬀered the borrower the best
possible contract hrc,x ci that just breaks even, that is, rc = Rg(xc), where,
pR
g(xc)+( 1 − p)R
b(xc)=1.
Assuming Rg(xn) − rn > 0, the original contract satisﬁes,
prn +( 1 − p)R
b(xn) ≥ 1. (55)
For the competitor’s contract to be attractive to a ﬁr m ,i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a txc <x n,
but this implies that rn >R g(xc), and thus, that inequality (55) is strict, contradicting
the optimality of the original contract. Note, this argument doesn’t depend on parametric
assumption (52)–which guarantees that the original contract is enforceable–but only on the
fact that the information available to either bank in period 1 is identical to the information
available to the initial lender when the initial contract was signed. Said diﬀerently, there is
nothing to negotiate about, because there is no new information.
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Now assume that inequality (52) doesn’t hold, that is, the optimal non-negotiable contract
is unenforceable without monitoring. One might hope that by monitoring the lender could
produce an indicator that would satisfy inequality (8) and give the lender a credible threat
to liquidate borrowers with a bad indicator. But since the monitoring level is chosen by
the lender to maximize its expected proﬁts, it can’t credibly precommit to monitor at such
a level. To see this, assume that the borrower has chosen to honor the contract on the
assumption that the lender has monitored. The lender’s best response is not to monitor.
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